Quantifying the shadow economy: measurement with theory by Pere Gomis-Porqueras et al.
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 




























FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 






Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Christopher Waller
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
University of Notre Dame
May 31, 2011
Abstract
We construct a dynamic, general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose
to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method
that avoids recordkeeping ￿cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the theoretical
measure of the ￿ shadow economy￿from our model. We then calibrate our model using
money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a
sample of 30 countries and compare our estimates to traditional ad hoc estimates. Our
results generate reasonably larger estimates for the size of the shadow economy than
exist in previous literature.
JEL Codes: E4, E5.
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11 Introduction
There is a vast literature that studies the shadow, or underground, economy (see Schneider
and Enste (2000) for a review). While the de￿nition of the shadow economy is subject to
debate, a standard taxonomy attributes most of this activity to being the result of either 1)
trade in illegal goods and services, or 2) tax evasion.1
The key question in this literature is how large is the shadow economy? Answering this
question requires measuring the activity in the shadow economy. This is hard to do since
the point of trading in this economy is to avoid detection. Therefore researchers have to
employ indirect methods to tease out estimates of the size of the shadow economy. These
methods include surveys of citizens, discrepancies in national income accounting, money
demand estimation and electricity use.
Estimates for the shadow economy in OECD countries range from 5% of o¢ cial GDP to
27% while developing economies are much higher, ranging from 25% of o¢ cial GDP to around
70%. While there is considerable uncertainty around these estimates, if they are remotely
accurate, then studying the shadow economy would appear to be of ￿rst-order importance
for economists studying business cycle behavior, optimal ￿scal policy and development.
However, a survey of this literature reveals a surprising observation ￿none of the empirical
estimates are obtained using a rigorous theoretical model. This observation has been made
before. In his paper "Quantifying the Black Economy: ￿ Measurement without Theory￿Yet
Again?", Thomas (1999) forcefully critiques this literature for not using economic theory to
derive estimates of the shadow economy or the implications of those estimates. To quote
￿A large number of economists have sought to estimate the size of the black
economy, but often without giving any explicit reasons for why this exercise is
worth undertaking. It seems that a large black economy is ￿ a bad thing￿ , as it may
undermine people￿ s willingness to pay taxes and a government￿ s ignorance of the
size of the black economy may lead to the imposition of incorrect macroeconomic
policies. However, how large is large? What is important, the absolute level of
the black economy, its relative size or its rate of change over time? Suppose that
a committee of wise and learned economists, after much thought and consulta-
tion, informs the government that in their collective judgement the size of the
black economy in the United Kingdom in 1998 corresponds to 12.56% of GNP.
What should the government do? Should it behave di⁄erently if the estimate
were 22.56%? Without a theoretical framework, we have no way to answer these
questions.￿(Thomas, p. F381 emphasis added)
1See Feige (1989, 1994) for more on this de￿nition.
2A careful inspection of the literature since the publication of Thomas￿ s paper shows that
almost no progress has been made in using theory to guide our measurement of the shadow
economy.2 Why is this? It could be that the size of the shadow economy is a macroeconomic
issue yet most of the behavior of the shadow economy involves microeconomic decision-
making on tax evasion, illegal activities and the like. It could be that monetary exchange is
at the heart of trade in the shadow economy and this requires a dynamic, general equilibrium
model to understand how aggregate currency demand is driven by individual decisions to
evade taxes.
The lack of a rigorous model to measure the shadow economy is surprising to a modern
macroeconomist. Why? Because modern macroeconomics builds dynamic, general equilib-
rium models with microfoundations and calibrate them to the data. While this methodology
is standard in macroeconomics, to date, it has not been done in the shadow economy litera-
ture.3 Our objective in this paper is to do just that.
We de￿ne the shadow economy as cash transactions done solely to evade taxes. The
formal economy consists of all reported income. We do not include tax evasion done via
accounting mismeasurement nor do we make a distinction between legal and illegal goods ￿
all goods are legal in our economy. Evasion of taxes is the only illegal activity. Clearly, illegal
activities are an important component of the shadow economy however we have chosen to
ignore it. The reason for doing so is twofold. First, we do not want to get bogged down in
a discussion of why some goods or services are illegal. Second, sorting out legal from illegal
goods in the international data is a quantitative nightmare. As a result, one should take our
estimates as a lower bound on the size of the shadow economy.
To conduct our analysis, we use the Lagos-Wright (2005) search theoretic model of money.
The LW model is convenient for two reasons. The centralized-decentralized trading structure
works well for capturing the idea that some trades are easily measured (those in centralized
markets) while others are more easily hidden (those in decentralized meetings). Second, the
quasi-linear preference structure allows us to control the distribution of money balances over
time.
The main di⁄erence from LW is that we assume there are no information frictions that
make money essential for trade. In our environment there is a record-keeping technology,
communication of trading histories, and enforcement of contracts that makes credit transac-
2By structural, we mean a fully speci￿ed dynamic, general equilibrium model with optimizing agents ￿
not a structural econometric model.
3There are several papers that have used dynamic general equilibrium models to study the shadow
economy [see Koreshkova (2005), Amaral and Quintin (2006), Aruoba (2009)] but none of them use the
models to estimate the size of the shadow economy. In fact, some like Koreshkova (2005), use prevailing
estimates of the shadow economy to calibrate the the size of the shadow economy in their models.
3tions possible. Therefore, trades in all markets can, in principle, be conducted with credit.
However, if agents use credit then the transaction is recorded and reported to the government
who can enforce payment of income taxes. On the other hand, in decentralized meetings,
monetary transactions are not recorded or reported to the government, which allows agents
to evade income taxes.
The key choice agents have to make is whether to use credit and be part of the formal
economy or participate in the shadow economy by using money to evade taxes. While cash
allows agents to evade taxes it is not costless to do so ￿money can be taxed via in￿ ation.
Thus, agents must decide whether to pay the in￿ ation tax or the income tax (or some
combination of the two) and this in turn determines the size of the shadow economy.
Our key theoretical results are as follows. First, the size of the shadow economy is
endogenous and depends on the rate of in￿ ation, the marginal tax rate and how the tax
savings from using cash are split between buyers and sellers. Second, distortionary taxation
is the main reason for the existence of a shadow economy. If the government ￿nances
spending with lump-sum taxes then credit is used to facilitate all trade and the shadow
economy disappears.4 Third, with distortionary taxation, the shadow economy exists as
long as the in￿ ation rate is not ￿ too high￿relative to the income tax rate. If in￿ ation is high
enough, agents resort to credit, pay the income tax and all trade is in the formal economy.
The critical in￿ ation rate is a function of the tax rate, buyer￿ s bargaining power and the
extent of trading frictions in the shadow economy.
Turning to our quantitative results, we show that standard money demand estimates can
be used to back out the size of the shadow economy. While this sounds similar to existing
currency demand approaches that quantify the size of the shadow economy, our framework
is an improvement to the prevailing literature since we do not require the assumption of
having no shadow economy in a base year. Moreover, since cash is the only means of
payment that leaves no trace, increases in currency demand deposits that are due largely to
a slowdown in demand deposits are not attributed to an increase in the shadow economy as
is typically assumed in the empirical literature.5 As a benchmark comparison of estimates,
we contrast them with those in Schneider and Enste (2000) which thoroughly canvasses the
literature on this issue. We report the results for 20 countries and ￿nd estimates varying
from 2% for the U.S. to over 400% for Russia. Our estimates also tend to be larger for most
countries than those reported in Schneider and Enste. However, due to the usual problem
of estimating money demand curves in conjunction with the short time series we have for
4This is a critical distinction from Aruoba￿ s (2009) model ￿if distortionary taxes are eliminated, he still
has a shadow economy. Thus, his model is not about tax evasion but rather illegal goods.
5We refer the reader to Gillian Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996) for a discussion of the impact
of this channel for the estimates of the shadow economy for the United States.
4some of our countries, we are suspicious as to the robustness of our estimates. However, our
main objective is to provide a methodology for using theoretical models to guide the process
of quantifying the shadow economy rather than deriving de￿nitive estimates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2, contains the environment and policy
actions. In Section 3, we construct an equilibrium for our economy. In Section 4, we
show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize it. It also contains some
examples and extensions of the basic model. Section 6 contains the calibration procedure
and our empirical estimates of the size of the shadow economy. Section 7 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The Environment Time is discrete and each period is divided into two subperiods. There
is a generic good that can be produced and consumed in each subperiod. This good is
perishable across subperiods. As in Rocheteau and Wright (2005), there is a continuum of
agents of measure 1 who are divided into two groups of equal size, called buyers and sellers.
Buyers wish to consume during the ￿rst subperiod but cannot produce while sellers can
produce in the ￿rst subperiod but do not wish to consume. In this subperiod, agents meet
pairwise in a decentralized market denoted DM and each buyer is matched with a seller with
probability ￿. Buyers get utility "u(q) from consuming q units of the good where " is an
idiosyncratic preference shock with distribution F(") and compact support [";"]. We assume
u0 (q);￿u00 (q) > 0 and u(0) = 0. Sellers incur utility cost c(q) from producing q units of
the good with the following properties c0 (q) > 0; c00 (q) ￿ 0 and c(0) = 0.
In the second subperiod all agents consume and goods are traded in a centralized Wal-
rasian market denoted CM. Agents can also sell labor to competitive ￿rms and are paid w
per unit of labor supplied. Both sets of agents get utility U (x) from consuming x units of
the good and incur disutility cost ￿h from supplying h units of the good. Time is discounted
from the CM to the DM at rate ￿C = ￿ < 1 and from the DM to the CM at rate ￿D = 1.
Firms in the CM can produce one unit of output per unit of labor used in production. It then
follows that w = 1. Although we assume that there are di⁄erent utility and production costs
across the two sub-periods, none of our results would change if we assumed U (x) = u(q)
and c(q) = q.
In the CM, agents take prices parametrically. Let PCM denote the money price of goods.
It is more convenient to use ￿ = 1=PCM which is the CM goods price of money. In the
DM, terms of trade for pairwise meetings are determined by proportional bargaining. This
entails distributing a fraction ￿ of the match surplus to the buyer, and fraction 1 ￿ ￿ to the
5seller. Since buyers cannot produce in the DM some form of payment is needed to entice
sellers to trade. We assume that individual trading histories can be costlessly recorded
and communicated to other agents. We also assume promises of repayment can be enforced.
Consequently, credit is a feasible form of payment in both the DMand the CM. It is important
to stress that our assumptions imply that ￿nancial markets are fully developed and e¢ ciently
operated. Hence, our results are not driven by incomplete ￿nancial markets.
We also assume there is a ￿at object called money that can be used for payment in either
market. The aggregate stock of ￿at currency per capita is given by Mt and grows at the
gross rate of ￿ = 1 + ￿ implying Mt = ￿Mt￿1. Monetary injections occur in the CM and as
payment for goods and services. Let z = M=PCM = ￿M denote real balances in the CM.
Finally, for notational purposes we drop the t subscript and denote time as ￿1 for t￿1; +1
for t + 1 and so on.
Fiscal Policy We assume that the government uses distortionary and lump-sum taxes to
￿nance a constant stream of government spending, G, in the CM. The government imposes a
linear tax rate ￿ on labor income that can be observed and uses lump-sum taxes T as needed
to balance the budget. All taxes are paid in the CM even if the income was generated in
the DM. At this point, we do not need to assume that money is issued by the government.
Agents may choose to use another object as a medium of exchange, e.g. a foreign currency
that is not controlled by the local government. But as a useful starting point, we will assume
that government-issued ￿at money is the monetary object in our economy.
Regarding the government￿ s ability to observe incomes, we assume that all labor income
generated in the CM is reported to the government by ￿rms. Thus, regardless of whether
wage payments are made in cash or with credit, income is observed and thus can be taxed.
However, income earned by sellers in the DM may or may not be observed by the government
depending on the form of payment used. For illustration, suppose in a DM trade, a buyer pays
with a combination of cash and credit. The seller extends a loan of size ‘ to the buyer and
this is reported to the government, who treats the recorded transaction ‘ as taxable income.
However, whatever portion of the transaction that is done with money is not recorded and
so there is nothing to report to the government. Furthermore, we assume the government
cannot observe agent￿ s money holdings in the CM. Consequently, cash income earned by
sellers is unobservable and cannot be taxed.
The government budget constraint is
G = ￿H + ￿L + T + ￿(M ￿ M￿1)
6where H is aggregate labor income in the CM, L the reported income of all sellers in the
DM and T is lump-sum tax revenue. The last term is real seigniorage.
3 Markets and trades
3.1 CM
Buyers During the centralized market buyers not only choose how much to consume and
work but also how much money to carry to the next period￿ s decentralized market. These
choices are made before "+1 is realized in the next DM. Loan payments also must be settled.
Hence, at the beginning of the centralized market the problem of a representative buyer
holding z units of real balances and outstanding real loans ‘ (a liability) is denoted by:
W (z;‘) = max
x;h;z+1
fU(x) ￿ h + ￿V (z+1)g (1)
s:t: x = (1 ￿ ￿)h + z ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿z+1 ￿ T
where ￿ = ￿=￿+1 is the in￿ ation rate in the CM from period t to the t + 1. This problem
can be rewritten as
W (z;‘) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (z ￿ ‘ ￿ T) + max
x;z+1
￿
U(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿z+1 + ￿V (z+1)
￿
:
The ￿rst-order conditions yield
U
0(^ x) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (2)
￿V
0 (z+1) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (= if z+1 > 0) (3)
and the envelope conditions are Wz = ( 1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ;W‘ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1. The ￿rst best allocation
would satisfy U0(x￿) = 1 so the presence of distorting labor taxes lowers consumption since
^ x < x￿.
Sellers During the centralized market sellers choose consumption and how much labor to
supply. It is straightforward to show that seller￿ s will not take money balances into the
next DM since they have no need for it. Let the CM value function for a seller be denoted
W s (z;￿‘) where z ￿ ￿m and ‘ are his holdings of real balances and loans extended (an
asset) measured in units of the CM good. Hence, the value function of a representative seller
7at the beginning of the CM is given by:
W
s (z;‘) = max
x;h
fU(x) ￿ h + ￿V
sg (4)
s:t: x = (1 ￿ ￿)h + z + [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]‘ ￿ T:
where V s is the value function entering the next DM for a seller and
￿ (‘) = ￿ if ‘ ￿ 0
￿ (‘) = 0 otherwise.
This function taxes income earned via issuing credit but does not subsidize borrowing by
sellers. The idea is to tax income and not ￿nancial transactions unrelated to the generation
of income. Substituting out for h using the budget constraint yields
W
s (z;￿‘) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 fz + [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]‘ ￿ Tg + max
x
￿
U(x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 x + ￿V
s￿
The ￿rst-order conditions yield U0(^ x) = (1 ￿ ￿)




‘ (z;‘) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]. The envelope conditions show that cash has a
higher value in the CM to a seller than income received as a loan repayment.
3.2 DM
In the decentralized market buyers observe their idiosyncratic realization of " and with
probability ￿ are randomly matched with a seller. Terms of trade are given by proportional
bargaining with threat points given by no trade. The seller has to decide whether or not to
o⁄er credit to the buyer. If it is extended, the buyer decides whether to use it or not. As we
show below, the buyer will always use credit if it is o⁄ered. If credit is used, the value paid
for with credit is recorded as taxable income for the seller. If cash is used for any part of the
transaction, it is not recorded and is part of the shadow economy. The ￿rst best allocation
is the quantity q￿
" solving "u0 (q￿
") = c0 (q￿
").
In a match with a buyer of type ", the seller produces q" for the buyer. The ￿rst best
allocation is the quantity q￿
" solving "u0 (q￿
") = c0 (q￿
"). The buyer gives the seller d" units of
real balances and receives a loan of size ‘". The buyer￿ s surplus is
S
b
" ￿ "u(q") + W (z ￿ d";‘") ￿ W (z;0)
= "u(q") ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (d" + ‘");
8while the sellers surplus equals:
S
s
" ￿ ￿c(q") + W
s (d";‘") ￿ W
s (0;0)
= ￿c(q") + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 d" + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]‘":
The total surplus in a match of type " is given by:
S" = "u(q") ￿ c(q") ￿ ￿ (‘)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ‘":
It is obvious from this expression that using credit, ceteris paribus lowers the match surplus.
The reason is the seller has to pay taxes on this income which lowers the net gains from trade.
Thus, by lowering the amount of credit extended by one unit, the seller saves ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) units
of labor in the next CM. This creates extra surplus for the buyer and seller to split.
With proportional bargaining, the buyer gets the fraction ￿S" while the seller gets










" = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




The buyer￿ s surplus can be rearranged to obtain
d" = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(q") + ￿c(q")] ￿ [1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]‘":
For ‘ > 0, we have j@‘"=@d"j = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 > 1 for ￿ > 0. Bringing in one less unit of
real balances increases the loan amount by more than one unit. This is the way in which
the seller must be compensated for extending credit.6 Typically, by using an extra unit of
cash rather than credit, a buyer saves principal and interest on a loan, 1 + i. The implicit





The implicit interest rate is increasing in both the tax rate and the buyer￿ s bargaining power.
The tax rate e⁄ect is clear ￿the higher is ￿ the more costly it is for the seller to extend
credit to the buyer. Therefore he charges a higher rate of interest. What is less clear is why
the interest rate is increasing in the buyer￿ s bargaining power. One￿ s intuition would be that
it should go down. The reason is as follows: As ￿ increases, the buyer can extract more q
from the seller. Since the money holdings are given in the match, the seller has to give a
6Alternatively, reducing the loan amount more than 1-for-1 is the way the seller compensates the buyer
for bringing in an additional unit of money.
9bigger loan to the buyer which imposes a tax liability on the seller. In order to compensate
the seller, the implicit interest rate that the buyer pays must therefore go up.
The seller faces the following problem:
max
q";d":‘"
￿c(q") + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 d" + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]‘"
s:t: 0 ￿ d" ￿ z; 0 ￿ ‘"
￿
￿
"u(q") ￿ c(q") ￿ ￿ (‘)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ‘￿
￿
￿ "u(q") ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (d" + ‘"):
The seller chooses how much output to produce and how the buyer should pay for it subject
to the constraint that the buyer receives no less than Sb
". The solution to this problem is as
follows. For z ￿ z￿













For ~ z" < z < z￿
", where ~ z" is de￿ned below, we obtain
d" = z; ￿ (‘) = ‘" = 0
z = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(^ q") + ￿c(^ q")]
where ^ q" < q￿
" and is increasing in z. In both cases, no credit is extended so the entire value
of the trade is in the shadow economy.
For 0 ￿ z < ~ z" we have
d" = z ￿ (‘) = ￿;
‘" = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 f(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(~ q") + ￿c(~ q")] ￿ zg (6)
"u
0(~ q") = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 c
0(~ q")
where ~ q" < ^ q" and ~ z" ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(~ q") + ￿c(~ q")]. Note that the critical values, z￿
"
and ~ z" di⁄er across buyer types. It is straightforward to show that both are monotonically
increasing in ". In this last case, some part of the trade is recorded in the formal sector while
the cash portion goes into the shadow economy.
The nature of this solution is that if the buyer has su¢ ciently high real balances, he
acquires the ￿rst-best quantity and pays with cash. No credit is used and the transaction is
not recorded. If the buyer￿ s real balances are somewhat lower (below z￿
") the seller chooses
not to extend credit and accepts only cash. However, rather than the ￿rst-best quantity he
10produces something less. Again, the transaction is not recorded. Finally if real balances are
low enough, then the seller takes all of the cash and gives the buyer enough credit to acquire
~ q". The portion of the transaction involving credit is recorded and the seller pays taxes on
that earned income in the CM.
There are several key observations from this solution. First, for z < ~ z" the quantity
traded, ~ q", is independent of how much money is exchanged. This means that even if the
buyer has no cash, trade still occurs in the DM via the use of credit. Second, the critical
values for money balances, z￿
" and ~ z", are functions of the buyer￿ s preference parameter. For
high " buyers, the ￿rst-best quantity is much larger so z￿
" is larger as well. The reverse is true
for low " buyers. Hence, for a given amount of real balances, a buyer may get the ￿rst-best
quantity using only cash if he has a low preference shock whereas he gets ~ q" < q￿
" and pays
with cash and credit if he has a high preference shock.
3.3 Optimal money buyer￿ s money holdings
Buyers must choose the optimal amount of real balances to carry from the CM to next
period￿ s DM. The key tradeo⁄s of this intertemporal choice are the cost of carrying money
(given by the in￿ ation rate) vis-a-vis the expected bene￿t of using money for trades in the
DM. Speci￿cally, the buyer￿ s intertemporal optimization is:
max




















Here, the function "￿(z) is a value such that all decentralized trades with preference shock
lower than "￿(z) are not constrained. In turn, e "(z) captures the lowest value of the preference
shock such that the DM bargaining problem requires a positive loan. The properties of
the proportional bargaining solution derived before imply functions "￿(z) and e "(z) are well
de￿ned, increasing, and satisfy e "(z) ￿ "￿(z) for all z.7 Finally, note that the nominal interest
rate on a bond traded from the CM to the next CM would pay 1+i = (1 + r)(1 + ￿) where
￿ is the in￿ ation rate from today￿ s CM to tomorrow￿ s CM. It is straightforward to show that
i = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿.
The tradeo⁄s faced by the buyer can be easily seen by computing how a marginal increase
7Our appendix provides a formal proof for these results.
11in real holdings a⁄ects the buyer￿ s intertemporal objective. The derivative of the buyer￿ s




["u0(^ q") ￿ c0(^ q")]
[(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(^ q") + ￿c0(^ q")]
dF(") (8)
￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)





This expression is fairly intuitive. The ￿rst term is the cost of bringing money into the
DM. The derivative of the second term of the buyer￿ s objective is zero because the expected
payo⁄of unconstrained trades does not change by bringing more money. The second term in
(8) is the expected increase in the buyer￿ s surplus that results from bringing more money to
constrained trades that do not use credit. The last term in (8) re￿ ects the fact that bringing
more money lowers the size of loans in transactions where credit is used, and thus the tax
extracted from the match. This tax savings is partially passed to the buyer, as dictated by
the bargaining solution.
4 Equilibrium
For the reminder of this paper we will focus our attention on symmetric stationary equilibria.
Symmetry requires all similar agents to undertake the same actions. We say that a stationary
equilibrium is monetary when buyers carry a strictly positive amount of real balances from
the centralized market to next period￿ s decentralized market.
Stationary equilibria is an income tax rate, ￿; and a collection of sequences of lump-sum
transfers, prices, money holdings, and time-invariant allocations of consumption and hours










such that: (a) The money holdings, consumption and hours worked allocations for the buyers
are optimal taking as given the tax rate, lump-sum transfers and terms of trade functions;
(b) the consumption and hours worked allocations solve the seller￿ s problem xs
t;hs
t; (c) the
money demanded by buyers equals the money supply; (d) equilibrium prices ￿t grow at the
same rate as the money supply; (e) the government￿ s budget constraint is balanced.
The main theoretical results on the shadow economy are summarized by the following
proposition and corollary:
12Proposition 1 A unique stationary equilibrium exists. Further, there are three classes of
equilibria: (i) Buyers hold enough money so that all trades in the DM are done using cash;
(ii) There is a high enough in￿ation rate, ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ [1 + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿1], such that buyers hold no
money and thus all DM transactions are based on credit;(iii) There are intermediate in￿ation
rates such that buyers carry a positive amount of money. If credit is used in a match, it is
used simultaneously with money.
The key point of this proposition is that the size of the shadow economy hinges on the
in￿ ation rate relative to the critical in￿ ation rate ~ ￿ which in turn depends on the labor tax
rate and other key parameters.
The derivative of the buyer￿ s objective (8) and Proposition 1 imply the following rela-
tionships.
Corollary 2 For a given parameterization: (i), a higher in￿ation rate lowers the money
holdings of buyers thus increasing the measure of trades where credit is used; (ii) higher
income taxes increase the return of money and thus lower the measure of trades where credit
is used.
For very low in￿ ation rates, the in￿ ation tax on cash is small and buyers are willing to
carry more cash to get better terms of trades from sellers. This means the shadow economy
is relatively large. As in￿ ation increases, the in￿ ation tax that buyers must incur rises as
well. As a result, they carry less cash and rely on some credit to help ￿nance their purchases
from sellers. Finally, for su¢ ciently high in￿ ation rates, buyers would have to bear a high
in￿ ation tax to help sellers evade taxes. Since they do not pay the income taxes, they are
not willing to carry cash into the DM, which drives the size of the shadow economy to
zero. This captures a common intuition that high in￿ ation allows governments to tax the
shadow economy and drive agents into the formal economy. Hence, according to our model,
increasing in￿ ation results in a smaller informal sector, while increasing taxes increases the
size of the informal sector.
For su¢ ciently high in￿ ation rates, our model predicts that the shadow economy disap-
pears, However, we are assuming that there is not another currency available to conduct
transactions. If agents had to use domestic currency to trade in the shadow economy then
the government could just in￿ ate at high enough rates to drive everyone into the formal
economy. However, in reality, if a government tried this, agents could easily switch to a
foreign currency to conduct trades. Thus, currency substitution puts an upper bound on
how much the government can in￿ ate to tax the shadow economy.
Note that the larger is ￿ the larger is ~ ￿. This also is true for an increase in ￿. Both
parameters make money more valuable when trading which increases the real demand for
13money and thus the quantity of goods exchanged. Consequently, ^ q" is traded over a wider
range of real balances. This has the e⁄ect of crowding out formal (credit) trades.
It should be stressed that the buyer does not pay the income taxes associated with the
credit transaction. Thus, he would always prefer to use credit. It is the seller who bene￿ts
from the cash transaction. So the seller must induce the buyer to bring cash into the DM by
sharing the tax saving with him. The seller does so by charging him a lower price for cash
relative to credit. Note that if we have seller-take-all, ￿ = 0, then ~ ￿ = ￿ (or the Friedman
rule, i = 0) is the only monetary equilibrium. In short, if the seller does not share any of
the tax savings associated with cash, the buyer will not bring any cash and will use credit
as a means of payment.
4.1 Examples
Homogeneous buyers In order to understand how heterogeneity a⁄ects the model, sup-
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(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q") if ~ z" ￿ z ￿ z￿
";
1 + ￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 if z ￿ ~ z":
The ￿rst-order condition for z in the CM yields the following solutions for q"
q" = q￿
" for ￿ = ￿;
i =
￿￿["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]
(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q") for ￿ < ￿ ￿ ~ ￿; (9)
q" = ~ q" < q￿
" for ~ ￿ ￿ ￿:
The goods price of money is then
￿ = M￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(^ q") + ￿c(^ q")] for ￿ < ￿ ￿ ~ ￿;
￿ = z = 0 for ￿ > ~ ￿:
For ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ agents only use money to trade while for ￿ > ~ ￿ all buyers resort to credit to
pay the sellers. In short, no monetary equilibrium exists. This means all trade in the DM is
in the shadow economy or it is all in the formal sector. Thus, in order to have an equilibrium
where there is a mix of formal and informal trade in the DM, we need a non-degenerate
distribution over ".
14Two state example Consider the follow 2-point distribution " 2 f";"g where " occurs
with probability ￿. Conjecture that the spread between these two values is small enough so
that z￿
" > ~ z". We have the unique solutions for q"
q" = q￿
"; q" = q￿




￿ = i =
￿￿￿["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]




(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q") +
￿￿￿["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]
(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q")




for ￿1 < ￿ < ￿2;




(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q") for ￿2 ￿ ￿ < ~ ￿;
q" = ~ q", q" = ~ q" for ~ ￿ ￿ ￿
where ￿1 is derived from the following two equations




") ￿ c(￿ q")]
￿1 = ￿ + ￿
￿￿￿["u0(￿ q") ￿ c0(￿ q")]
(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(￿ q") + ￿c0(￿ q")
:
The ￿rst equation yields a value ￿ q" associated with the low " money balances just binding
while the second comes from the FOC. Similarly, we obtain ￿2 from
0 = (1 ￿ ￿)["u(~ q") ￿ "u(￿ q")] ￿ ￿[c(￿ q") ￿ c(~ q")]
￿2 = ￿ + ￿
￿
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)["u0(￿ q") ￿ c0(￿ q")]
(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(￿ q") + ￿c0(￿ q")




As before, for z ￿ ~ z" for ￿ > ~ ￿ no monetary equilibrium exists; only a credit equilibrium
exists. We now have a range of in￿ ation rates such that money and credit trades coexist;
those for ~ z" ￿ z ￿ ~ z". For z in this range, the high " buyers do not have enough cash so
they acquire ~ q" with a combination of cash and credit.
Figure 1 shows the di⁄erent possible equilibria. For ￿ = ￿ we get the ￿rst best. For
￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 we have an equilibrium where ^ q" < q￿
" and ^ q" < q￿
". In this range, again, all
trade in the DM is in the shadow economy. For ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ we have coexistence of money
and credit meaning some of the trades are in the shadow economy and some in the formal
economy. The high " buyer is using both cash and credit to acquire ~ q" while the low " buyer
















Figure 1: 2 Types of Buyers
is in the formal economy.
Productivity Di⁄erentials It is often argued that small ￿rms tend to be in the shadow
economy while larger ￿rms tend to operate in the formal economy. We can study this case
by assuming that sellers di⁄er by their productivities (either permanent or temporary). We
interpret high productivity sellers to be large ￿ ￿rms￿since the can produce a large amount
of output at a relatively low marginal cost. Low productivity ￿rms do the opposite.
Assume that sellers￿utility cost of producing is given by c(q;￿) where ￿ is a productivity
parameter with c￿ (q;￿);cq￿ (q;￿) < 0. Consider a 2-point distribution ￿ 2 f￿;￿g. In this
case, we can redo the bargaining solutions and derive the surpluses as before. We can show
existence of equilibrium as before: for ￿ = ￿ we get the ￿rst-best allocation and for ￿ > ~ ￿ we
have the credit-only equilibrium. For in￿ ation rates between those values, we can show that
a monetary equilibrium exists but uniqueness is di¢ cult to prove without further restrictions
(such as imposing buyer-take-all, ￿ = 1). For a 2 point distribution, linear utility and a CES
cost function, we obtain a unique equilibrium that can be characterized in Figure 2.
For ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 we have a money only equilibrium where all DM trade is in the shadow
economy. For ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ we have coexistence of trade in the formal and informal sectors.
The high ￿ sellers accept cash and extend credit to let the buyer acquire ~ q" while the low















Figure 2: 2 Types of Sellers
and above that only the credit equilibrium exists meaning all trade is recorded in the formal
economy.
In the ￿-model, for ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ large producers (the high productivity sellers) use credit
while low productivity sellers are paid in cash. This is consistent with empirical evidence
that large ￿rms tend to operate in the formal economy while small ￿rms are the ones most
likely to produce solely for cash in the informal sector.
5 Measuring the Size of the Shadow Economy
The size of the shadow economy is typically measured as a percentage of formal GDP. We
do the same in order to compare our estimates to the existing literature. Let sI denote the




where PIYI is nominal GDP in the shadow economy and PFYF is measured nominal GDP.
In our model, PIYI is equal to cash spent in the DM by buyers who have a match. As a
benchmark, consider the economy with homogeneous buyers. We showed that, in this case,
all trade in the DM is done in cash and is not recorded in formal GDP. The measure of








We can obtain an estimate of M=PFYF directly from the data once a time interval and
monetary aggregate are chosen. All that remains to be done is obtain a calibrated value of
￿.8
5.1 Calibration
Let the equilibrium relationship for money balances be given by M = L(i)PFYF where
PFYF is measured GDP and L(i) is an arbitrary function of the nominal interest rate.9






















Real CM output in our model is given by YCM = x￿ where x￿ solves U0(x￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1.

























8Our strategy follows Lucas (2000) and Lagos and Wright (2005) by using data to derive a money demand
curve. Intuitively, this approach gives us two numbers: 1) the interest elasticity (or semi-interest elasticity)
of money demand and 2) average money balances at the average nominal interest rate. The ￿rst is a ￿ slope￿
measurement and the second is a ￿ level￿measurement. We then construct a similar type of money demand
from our theoretical model and use these empircal values to pin down parameters in the theoretical money
demand curve.
9This formulation implicitly assumed an income elasticity of one for money demand.
18From the bargaining solution, real balances are given by
z = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)u(q) + ￿c(q)] (12)
Recall from (9) that
i =
￿￿["u0(q) ￿ c0(q)]
(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(q) + ￿c0(q)
for ￿ < ￿ ￿ ~ ￿: (13)
For ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ the size of the shadow economy is zero. Assume that in￿ ation is below this cuto⁄.









(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)u0(q) + ￿c0(q)]
2
[￿￿ ￿ i(1 ￿ ￿)]u00(q) ￿ (i￿ + ￿￿)c00 (q)
: (14)
Using (12) and (14) in (11) yields
￿i =
i
(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)u(q) + ￿c(q)]
(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)u0(q) + ￿c0(q)]
2
[￿￿ ￿ i(1 ￿ ￿)]u00(q) ￿ (i￿ + ￿￿)c00 (q)
:






Using (13) with b ! 0 we obtain
q =
￿
￿￿ ￿ i(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ + i)￿
￿1=￿




















In addition to ￿ we have two other parameters in this expression, ￿ and ￿, that need to be
pinned down. It is common to either use mark-up data on prices to pin down ￿ or to impose
buyer-take-all (￿ = 1). Since we cannot get reliable data on mark-ups across countries, we
choose to impose ￿ = 1. Furthermore, Waller (2011) shows that balanced growth in this
class of quasi-linear models requires ￿ = 1 (log utility in DM) so we impose this restriction




















We need to pin down two parameters, ￿ and B. We estimate standard money demand
regressions to obtain empirical estimates of the money demand elasticity, ^ ￿i. With those
estimates we use the average nominal interest rate over the sample period, ^ {, and (15) to get
a calibrated value ^ ￿. Since M=PCMYCM can be interpreted as the inverse of velocity, we use
the time averaged value of velocity and use it as an empirical value for ^ L(i): Using ^ {, ^ ￿ and
^ L(i) we can back out B from (16) which simply ensures logical consistency in the model.
6 Estimates of the Shadow Economy
6.1 Data
To calibrate ￿ we need to estimate money demand equations for the subset of countries we
study. This is a daunting task for several reasons. First, we have to confront all of the
problems and issues of estimating money demand functions in a world of changing ￿nancial
and payment structures. Second, while there are many problems obtaining robust estimates
of money demand elasticities for the U.S., the problem is even worse when looking at inter-
national data with developing nations. Finally, there are serious data issues when trying to
construct a consistent measure of money, in￿ ation and interest rates across a wide sample
of countries. Despite these problems, we proceed down this path in order to illustrate our
methodology for quantifying the size of the shadow economy.
We estimate a typical money demand equation given in (17), where the variables m,
y, and i are the logarithms of real money, real output, and nominal interest rate and ￿
indicates the ￿rst di⁄erence, according to the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
￿mt = ￿y￿yt + ￿i￿it ￿ ￿￿y￿yt￿1 ￿ ￿￿i￿it￿1 + ￿￿mt￿1 + ￿t: (17)
20All data is from the IMF/IFS. In general the sample of countries considered is given
by data availability (there has to be data for four di⁄erent time series￿over the same time
horizon). For each country, the sample is determined by the intersection of the time horizon
of each variable. We use nominal GDP and the GDP de￿ ator, seasonally adjusted when pos-
sible. For the interest rate, we considered the money market rate (Fed funds rate equivalent)
as provided by the IMF/IFS.
The biggest issue, somewhat surprisingly, is that the data on base money or M0 varies
widely due to di⁄ering M0 de￿nitions across countries. One way to deal with this is to use
IFS data that is constructed using the answers from a common survey of central banks that
asks for speci￿c asset positions. Hence, assuming reliable answers by the central banks, it
measures the exact same thing for about 100 countries. We use this data set to construct
Table 1 below. Countries with non-negative interest rate elasticities have been removed which
reduces the number of countries substantially. We also exclude Euro-zone economies since
the data is post European monetary union. We have very few Latin American countries in
our sample because of the instability in money demand estimates for most of these countries.
One reason that we get a large number of non-negative elasticity estimates is that the
IFS time series starts in 2001 implying a very small sample size per country. So, we looked
at other measures of M0 that where reported by central banks to the IMF/IFS to expand the
set of countries. These are not consistent de￿nitions of M0 across countries but we use them
anyway. Shadow economy estimates for these countries are contained in Table 2. In the
appendix we list the average interest rates, average values of M0=GDP and our estimates of
the interest elasticity of M0 for both the consistent and inconsistent measures of M0 (Tables
3 and 4 respectively).
6.2 Results
The results of our estimation yield the following sizes for the shadow economy for those
countries for which we obtained non-negligible interest elasticity estimates. The reason is
that for countries with interest elasticities close to zero, our calibrated values of ￿ get very
large and the size of the shadow economy is thousands of times larger than the formal
economy. We exclude these estimates. Since our main goal is to get some idea of the
quantitative magnitudes coming out of methodology, we report our estimates for a selected
set of economies in Tables 1 and 2. For comparison, we contrast our estimates to those of
Schneider and Enste (2000), who give a range of estimates for countries based on electricity
use and currency demand estimates. The superscript a denotes estimates of from Table 2
in SE, b corresponds to estimates in Table 4 of SE, c denotes estimates from Table 5 and d
21denotes those from Table 6.






















United States 2.4 8-10a




Hong Kong 38.8 13b
S. Korea 48.9 38-50a
Kyrgyzstan 156.1 14-36c





United Kingdom 19.9 13-23a
Several interesting observations arise. First, we obtain higher estimates of the shadow
economy compared to those reported in Schneider and Enste. Second, our U.S. estimate
is very low while Norway, New Zealand are very high. Fourth, our estimates for countries
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are substantially higher. Lastly, for 7 of
the 30 countries our estimates are close to or within the ranges reported in Schneider and
Enste, which suggests that there is some consistency in approaches. The di⁄erences in the
others may well be due to di⁄erent time periods studied. In the end, our estimates suggest
the shadow economy is a more important issue than previously considered and has serious
implications for public ￿nance, labor and monetary policy in a large number of countries.
Our benchmark model is very simple and to illustrate the method we imposed restrictions
on key parameters to reduce the calibration exercise to estimating a single parameter. How-
ever, one could calibrate the other parameters ￿ and ￿ as well as introducing heterogeneity
across buyers or sellers. This would require other data targets for the calibration. Given our
experience with the di¢ culty in obtaining consistent data constructions for M0 this is left
to future work.
7 Conclusion
Modern macroeconomics employs dynamic general equilibrium models as laboratories for
quantitative analysis. We use this methodology to tackle a quantitative issue that heretofore
lacks theoretical foundations ￿quantifying the size of the shadow economy.
We construct a dynamic monetary model where agents choose to engage in formal or
informal trades based on incentives to evade taxes. In this model the size of the shadow
23economy is endogenously determined and depends on the rate of in￿ ation, the marginal tax
rate and how the tax savings from using cash are split between buyers and sellers.
Finally, we derive estimates of the size of the shadow economy by calibrating the model
to estimates of the money demand for di⁄erent countries. The resulting measures of the
size of the shadow economy are on average higher than those reported in the literature
yet a non-trivial fraction are consistent with prevailing estimates. While there clearly is
more quantitative work that could be done using our framework, we believe our quantitative
analysis opens up new doors for research in this area.
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￿c(q") + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿d" + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]￿‘"
s:t: 0 ￿ d" ￿ m; 0 ￿ ‘"
"u(q") ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿(d" + ‘") ￿ ￿
￿





￿‘" = [1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]
￿1 f(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(q") + ￿c(q")] ￿ ￿d"g
Let ￿￿m denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the upper bound on d"; ￿￿‘ be the multiplier
on non-negative lending and ￿s be the multiplier on the buyer￿ s surplus constraint. We can
ignore the lower bound on d" for now. The FOC are
d" : 0 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿s (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1
q" : 0 = ￿c
0 (q") + ￿s [(1 ￿ ￿)"u
0 (q") + ￿c
0 (q")]
‘" : 0 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)] + ￿‘ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿s [1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]
For q" > 0;￿s > 0.
Case 1: ￿m = ￿‘ = 0: In this case we have
d" : ￿s = 1
q￿ : 0 = "u
0(q") ￿ c
0 (q")
‘" : ￿s =
1 ￿ ￿ (‘)
1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)
The ￿rst and last expressions require ￿ (‘) = 0 and thus ‘ = 0. Thus the solution has




￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(q￿
") + ￿c(q￿
")] ￿ m:
Case 2: ￿m = 0;￿‘ > 0: In this case we have ‘ = ￿ (‘) = 0 and
d" : ￿s = 1
q" : 0 = "u
0(q") ￿ c
0 (q")
which yields the same solution as before. So if ￿m = 0; then ‘ = ￿ (‘) = 0: In short, a buyer
would never take out a loan and keep some cash.
Case 3: ￿m > 0;￿‘ > 0: In this case we have ‘ = ￿ (‘) = 0; d" = m and q" solves ￿m =
27(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(q") + ￿c(q")]:
Case 4: ￿m > 0;￿‘ = 0. In this case we have d" = m and
q" : 0 = ￿c
0 (q") + ￿s [(1 ￿ ￿)"u
0 (q") + ￿c
0 (q")]
‘" : 0 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿s [1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]
q" : 0 = [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]"u
0(q") ￿ c
0 (q")
‘" : ￿s = [1 ￿ ￿ (‘)]=[1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]
and ‘" is given by
￿‘" = [1 ￿ ￿￿ (‘)]
￿1 f(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(q") + ￿c(q")] ￿ ￿mg:






















If this does not hold then we must have ‘" > 0 and ￿ (‘) = ￿. As a result we have
"u




￿‘" = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 f(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(~ q") + ￿c(~ q")] ￿ ￿mg
In this case we see that ~ q" is independent of m so ‘" > 0 requires
m < ￿
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"u(~ q") + ￿c(~ q")] ￿ ~ m":
Demand for Money. Here, we derive the properties of the cut-o⁄functions "￿(z) and ~ "(z):
We start by showing the money holdings required to obtained the unconstrained allocation















Hence, if costs are convex, the previous derivative is always positive. For the buyer to capture
a proportion ￿ of the total surplus, we must have:
z
￿






















Observe also that "￿(z) can be de￿ned implicitly, at each z, as the solution to







" is increasing in " it follows that "￿(z) in increasing in z:
To understand why ~ "(z) ￿ "￿(z), consider a shock "0 larger than, but close enough to
"￿(z): If credit is going to be used then the surplus obtained has to be larger than what is
attainable with money only. This is true because, other things equal, loans reduce the total
surplus. What is attainable with money only (in a constrained trade)? In these types of
trades output is given by
z = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)"0u(^ q"0) + ￿c(^ q"0)]:
Furthermore, ^ q"0 must converge to q￿
" as z ! z￿
"0: Hence, the surplus attainable with money
only when "0 approaches "￿(z) from above, is also close to the optimal one. What is attainable
with loans? Observe that output under a credit trade is given by
e "u
0(~ qe ") = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 c
0(~ qe "); (18)
because of the tax wedge, ~ qe " < ^ q"0. Thus, a trade with loans attains a strictly lower output,
involves a strictly positive loan and results then in a lower surplus. It follows that trades
with loans can only occur for shocks strictly higher than "￿(z):
Buyer￿ s objective. Consider now the derivative of the objective function evaluated at
strictly positive money holdings:
(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)








["u0(^ q") ￿ c0(^ q")]





















The last two terms of this derivative take into account that bringing more money changes
the types of trades the buyer may face. Speci￿cally, higher money holdings allow more un-
constrained trades to occur (the previous to last term), which obviously reduces the number
of constrained trades. Higher real holdings also increases the return of constrained trades,
which simultaneously reduces the set of trades where credit is employed. These last two
terms of the derivative of the buyer are, nevertheless, equal to zero. The previous to last
term is zero because it evaluates the surplus exactly at the shock where the constraint starts
binding. At that point the two surpluses are thus equal to each other. The last term is zero
because it evaluates surpluses exactly at the point where buying with credit is equivalent to
buying under a constrained trade.
Uniqueness of equilibrium. For ease of presentation, we start with the case where
in￿ ation is not too high, namely, (￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 > 0:
(a) For all money holdings 0 < z < z0 where z0 is the largest holding such that ~ "(z0) = ":
Because of the above assumption, the derivative of the buyer￿ s objective function is positive.
Optimal money holdings must be higher than z0:
(b) For money holdings z0 < z < z1; where z1 is the highest value of money holdings such
that "￿(z1) = " the derivative of the objective is
(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)








["u0(^ q") ￿ c0(^ q")]
[(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(^ q") + ￿c0(^ q")]
dF("):
We know "u0(^ q") ￿ c0(^ q") > 0: But since ~ "(z) is increasing in z the second term in the sum
is less than one. The sign of this derivative depends on the speci￿c functional forms and
parameterizations chosen. It is easy to impose additional regularity conditions such that
["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]
[(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q")] is decreasing in real money holdings. Under these conditions it su¢ ces to
check the value of this derivative at z1: If it is negative, then there is a unique zero for the
derivative of the buyer￿ s objective in the z0 < z < z1 range.
(c) Finally, for money holdings z > z1 we have ~ "(z) > "￿(z) > ": The derivative of the
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(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)








["u0(^ q") ￿ c0(^ q")]
[(1 ￿ ￿)"u0(^ q") + ￿c0(^ q")]
dF("):
We now show that as z increases to z￿
" then the last two terms of the function vanish. This
proves the objective is decreasing near z￿
": Hence, the derivative of the objective, if positive at
z1 must have a unique zero in the range z1 < z < z￿
" whenever
["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]
[(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q")] is decreasing
in z:
Uniqueness of equilibrium holds generally because the results in Wright (2010) can be
applied to our model even when
["u0(^ q")￿c0(^ q")]
[(1￿￿)"u0(^ q")+￿c0(^ q")] is not decreasing in real money holdings.
Equilibrium for high in￿ ation rates, that is, when (￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 < 0
imply the objective in decreasing in money holdings up to z = z1: Computing the optimum
requires thus a direct comparison of the surplus obtained with money holdings higher than
z1 and the surplus obtained when buyers carry zero money holdings and all transactions are
based on credit.
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Country Sample ^ { Velocity b ￿
Bolivia Q4 2001 - Q3 2009 8.5841 1.7634 -0.065923
Canada Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 6.983 30.09 -0.034319
China,P.R.:Macao 4.4709 3.9209 -0.013745
Georgia Q1 2001 - Q4 2007 22.4843 3.3693 -0.017559
Iceland Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 12.401 5.5021 -0.071336
Indonesia Q1 1997 - Q3 2010 13.9408 3.3505 -0.096313
Japan Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 5.5608 4.9234 -0.043127
Latvia Q1 2001 - Q3 2010 7.832 1.9231 -0.018309
Mauritius Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 8.6057 2.3308 -0.065743
Mexico Q4 1985 - Q3 2010 30.8255 29.3572 -0.020202
Morocco Q4 2001 - Q4 2009 6.0299 0.98054 -0.053208
Philippines Q4 1985 - Q4 2008 12.0721 2.9532 -0.068409
Poland Q4 1996 - Q3 2010 15.6368 3.2452 -0.095698
Romania Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 35.1549 3.709 -0.039838
Russian Federation Q4 2000 - Q3 2009 31.747 2.1928 -0.071025
South Africa Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 9.3932 21.0922 -0.04203
Sweden Q1 1995 - Q3 2004 8.2515 7.2107 -0.038893
Thailand Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 7.9905 2.4156 -0.011487
Turkey Q4 2001 - Q3 2010 50.8825 4.2728 -0.14624
United States Q1 1959 - Q4 2010 5.5864 17.1322 -0.13673
Table 4 Data for shadow economy estimates in Table 3.
Country Sample ^ { Velocity b ￿
Australia Q3 1969 - Q4 2010 8.2663 4.5683 -0.074468
Hong Kong Q4 1990 - Q4 2010 3.5711 1.7984 -0.051137
S. Korea Q4 1976 - Q3 2010 10.5771 4.1039 -0.05271
Kyrgyzstan Q1 2000 - Q4 2010 14.9351 2.108 -0.045377
New Zealand Q2 1987 - Q4 2010 9.0384 11.2564 -0.026454
Norway Q4 1971 - Q3 2009 8.2835 4.3842 -0.015789
Singapore Q1 2003 - Q3 2010 4.377 2.1922 -0.075167
Switzerland Q4 1975 - Q4 2010 2.4789 2.2242 -0.061206
Tunisia Q1 2000 - Q4 2007 7.6727 2.3984 -0.16271
United Kingdom Q1 1972 - Q4 2010 7.1609 5.1623 -0.069809
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